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INTRODUCTION
I am in Dublin trying to write about a wrong that seems to have
escaped our collective radar screen. It is quite difficult to understand
why the Castle Rock1 case has caused relatively little, if any, response
from the Colorado Legislature, the Colorado battered women’s com-
munity, or the advocacy community nation-wide. Here in Ireland,
when I explain what happened in Castle Rock, the response is unre-
served disbelief at the “Alice through the Looking Glass” logic applied
by the majority.
But there is more to this puzzle. In addition to the anemic re-
action by legislatures and advocates, much of the post-Castle Rock
scholarship accepts the terrain constructed by the Supreme Court.2
While critical of the decision, scholars do not contest the assump-
tions that structure the majority opinion. This article does just that,
and more.
In this article I reject the Supreme Court’s decision, not because
it failed to find a property interest in the enforcement of an order of
protection, but because of the values that structure the decision and
its rationale. It is my contention that nothing could or would have
influenced the Court to find for Jessica Gonzales because it adhered
to crabbed notions of collective responsibility in defense of the polit-
ical, economic, and legal status quo.
This article also raises the rather thorny issue of our failure to
contest the decision politically. The silence is deafening and destruc-
tive. No attempts have been made to reform immunity statutes that
shield the police from suit when they refuse to follow mandates. No
reforms have been initiated to correct the holes in mandatory arrest
statutes. Rather, Castle Rock and its progeny reinscribe the callous
disregard for women’s lives and the lives of their children that was
first conceived in DeShaney.
In Part I, a brief history of the Battered Women’s Movement will
acquaint the reader with the radical and feminist moorings of the
movement. Indeed this movement was shaped by the second wave
1. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Amber Fink, Every Reasonable Means: Due Process and the (Non)Enforce-
ment of a Restraining Order in Gonzales v. Town of Castle Rock, 24 LAW & INEQ. 375,
381-82, 394 (2006) (stating and working within the Castle Rock holding); Laura Oren, Some
Thoughts on the State-Created Danger Doctrine: DeShaney is Still Wrong and Castle Rock
is More of the Same, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 47, 59-60 (2006) (providing a cri-
tique of the Castle Rock decision); Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s
Legacy, the Court’s Assault on New Property: The Right to the Mandatory Enforcement of
a Restraining Order Is a “Sham,” “Nullity,” and “Cruel Deception,” 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321,
332-38 (2006) (describing and working within the structure of the majority opinion).
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of feminism in both ideology and methodology, locating male intimate
violence as a manifestation of gender asymmetry in law and culture.
To understand the importance of mandatory arrest, it is essential
to place it in an historical context, rather than view it as either a
“free-form” strategy or a policy crafted by governmental bureaucrats.
Mandatory arrest was a statement of women’s equality before the
law, with the survivor worthy of state protection and the perpetrator
worthy of collective condemnation.
Part II lays out the facts of both Castle Rock and a Third Circuit
case that incorporates the Castle Rock ruling and rational. In Burella
v. City of Philadelphia,3 the Third Circuit relied on Castle Rock in re-
jecting a battered woman’s claim that the Philadelphia police violated
the procedural due process prong of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In
denying Jill Burella’s substantive due process claim, the Third Circuit
also incorporated the DeShaney ruling. Part II then sets out Castle
Rock’s rationale, but from a decidedly different approach. I charac-
terize the trilogy of DeShaney, Castle Rock, and Burella as cruel
deceptions or lies because they pretend to leave open the hope that
mandatory arrest statutes can be reformed to pass constitutional
muster, specifically in relation to Fourteenth Amendment conceptions
of substantive and procedural due process.
Part III is at once my kernel of truth and the guts of this article.
I argue that the guiding hand in Castle Rock is Justice Rehnquist
and his belief that the Constitution is a negative rights document,
casting protection of battered women outside the ambit of constitu-
tional concern. Moreover, I reject the terrain constructed by the Court
by introducing the idea that Castle Rock is no more than a reification
of the legal, political and economic status quo, and that because it de-
fends the status quo, nothing that Gonzales, Burella, or state legisla-
tures could argue or enact would satisfy the position of this Supreme
Court. As a result, any hope in due process protection is misplaced.
I unpack, as my theorist friends would say, what I mean by “the
reification of the legal, political, and economic status quo,” and what
drives it. Part of what drives this process is the mistaken distinction
between passive and active conduct: the age-old legal duty argument
which flows from the void. Throughout the article, you will note that
I do not use the phrases “failure to respond” or “failure to act.” This
is not a consequence of literary license, but rather a deliberate recog-
nition that affirmative police conduct occurred when the police chose
not to enforce the order held by Jessica Gonzales. Critical to the
3. 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007).
4. Id. at 143, 145-46.
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Court’s position is its defense of state political and economic power
embedded in police discretion and protected by the public duty doc-
trine. Such conceptions of state conduct, power, and economic primacy
operate at the expense of battered women and their children.
In Part IV, I turn the focus on the advocates and state actors.
Using Colorado as an example, I try to understand why there has not
been any movement to reform, radically alter, or confront the prob-
lems with Colorado’s mandatory arrest statute or the Governmental
Immunity Act. Consequently, I examine the decision not to respond
to the situation created by Castle Rock, and more recently, Burella.
In this section, I draw from my own experience as a scholar, teacher,
and member of the Battered Women’s Movement, and from inter-
views with advocates in Colorado and New York.5
Finally, in Part V, I propose an antidote to Castle Rock by craft-
ing a legislative alternative to the miasma created by the decision
that specifically addresses liability and mandatory language for
arrest statutes.
I. IN THE BEGINNING G-D CREATED THE BATTERED
WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
A. A Brief Initiation to the Battered Women’s Movement
In the 1970s a new movement joined the myriad political move-
ments of that decade—the Battered Women’s Movement (BWM).6 The
BWM was a corollary of the second wave of feminism and a direct out-
growth of the social, political, and economic upheavals of the 1960s.7
Questions of race, gender, and sexual orientation were on the political
front burner. Activists critiqued the position of women, men and
women of color, gays and lesbians within the social fabric.8 As a
consequence of this critique, the relationship or status between men
and women in the family, and the placement of this unit within the
socio-political spectrum came under scrutiny.9
5. Interviews were conducted in the summer and fall of 2007, and included members
of the advocacy, legal, and judicial communities. All interviewees requested anonymity and
therefore shall remain anonymous. Notes from the interviews are retained by the author.
6. G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 248 (2005);
see also SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 29 (1982) (discussing the rapid emergence of the
Battered Women’s Movement in the 1970s).
7. Miccio, supra note 6, at 248 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 248-49 (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 249.
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Feminists, long aware of the violence perpetrated in the family,
named the violence, the women abused, the perpetrators, the male
intimates, and the socio-political and legal structure that supported,
condoned, and codified the violence. This was radical in the 1960s just
as it is radical now. I imagine a colleague or two might recoil at the
explicit naming of victim/perpetrator. But name we must, giving voice
to the victim and charting accountability. Truth may enlighten but
it is also painful. Indeed, one need only ask the millions of women
beaten annually or the families of the 2000 to 4000 women beaten to
death each year.10 One only need ask Jessica Gonzales or Jill Burella.
B. The Rise of Mandated Arrest: Antidote to Systemic Misogyny?
I use the “M” word (misogyny) decidedly, which, I trust, creates
more of a stir than the “F” word. To the skeptics I ask: How else can
we explain social acceptance of male intimate violence? How else can
we justify the verity of the marital rape exemption, legally incapaci-
tating wives from withholding consent to sex?11 And, how do we
explain away the police’s, courts’, and prosecutors’ refusal to prose-
cute violence against women in the home?12
Subtle chastisement and corrective action were code words
for beating and treating wives along a fault line of power—where
power was based on the gender and status of the parties.13 I think
10. MICHAEL L. PENN & RAHEL NARDOS, OVERCOMING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
GIRLS: THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ERADICATE A WORLDWIDE PROBLEM 71 (2003)
(citation omitted).
11. John Stuart Mill wrote in 1859:
The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards
himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power
which it allows him to possess over others. This obligation is almost entirely
disregarded in the case of the family relations . . . . The almost despotic power
of husbands over wives need not be enlarged upon . . . .
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 116 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1991) (1859) (alteration in original); see also People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 575
(N.Y. 1984) (declaring that the marital rape exemption in New York’s penal law violated
equal protection under the New York Constitution); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY:
THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 94 (1987) (discussing the marital rape exception).
12. See RUTH W. MESSINGER & RONNIE M. ELDRIDGE, N.Y. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: THE CITY’S RESPONSE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE 18, 40, 58
(1993) (reporting the failure of the New York courts and police officers to respond to family
violence); see also SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 158 (“[B]attered women’s cases ‘dis-
appeared’ as they proceeded through the criminal justice system . . . .” (citation omitted));
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 343, 349 (2007) (discussing how the police treated domestic violence as “technical”
violence (quoting Kay L. Levine, The Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy,
and Equality in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 EMORY L.J. 691, 701 (2006))).
13. See SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 216-18 (discussing the history of battering being
used to chastise wives).
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that “misogyny” actually understates the problem. Perhaps, as
Andrea Dworkin notes, such violence is much more than misogyny,
it is gynocide.14
Male intimate violence is gendered.15 We know that four battered
women are killed every day in the United States.16 If four Jews or
four African Americans were killed and the state stood by, we would
call that state-sponsored genocide. Or as Professor Sarah Buel noted,
“[i]f foreign terrorists were attacking [four Americans per day] . . .
the Department of Defense would likely have long ago fired up the
F-16’s and dispatched elite, special forces . . . .”17 What have we
learned? That context is key.
Male intimate violence, like racial or homophobic violence, is a
problem embedded primarily in the structure of the social order—not
in the psyche of individual men.18 Battered women’s advocates appre-
ciated this: they, not unlike their sisters in the suffragist movement,19
understood that male privilege, of which intimate violence is a mani-
festation, is about power.20
The police, the critical law enforcement actor, systematically
refused to arrest male intimate partners.21 Such conduct was neither
a consequence of coincidence, nor a matter of police discretion, as
touted by Justice Scalia in Castle Rock. Rather it was a result of
policies promulgated by the police and their counterparts in the law
enforcement community. For example:
14. See ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING 93-150 (1974) (examining how certain acts
of violence against women constitute gynocide); see also MARY DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE
METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM 233-34 (1974) (viewing medical violence against women
as gynocide).
15. The federal Violence Against Women Act recognized this phenomenon and I
would challenge anyone to assert, much less prove, that the U.S. Congress is a bastion
of feminism.
16. Sarah Buel & Margaret Drew, Do Ask and Do Tell: Rethinking the Lawyer’s Duty
to Warn in Domestic Violence Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 452 (2006) (citing CALLIE
MARIE RENNISTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME DATA BRIEF: INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001 (2003)).
17. Id. at 453.
18. Michèle Harway, Battered Women: Characteristics and Causes, in BATTERING AND
FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 34-36 (Marsali Hansen & Michèle Harway
eds., 1993); NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN: NEW
INSIGHTS INTO ENDING ABUSIVE RELATIONSHIPS 94-95 (1998).
19. See ELLEN DUBOIS, The Last Suffragist: An Intellectual and Political Autobiography,
in WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 3-5 (1998) (discussing how suffragists con-
centrated their efforts on the inequality of the sexes in the political and social spheres).
20. David Adams, Treatment Models on Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 178-88 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds.,
1988); SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 20-24.
21. SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 158 (citation omitted).
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[T]he Law Enforcement and Assistance Administration (LEAA)
created six model projects to train officers in “crisis intervention”
to respond to domestic violence calls. The therapeutic profes-
sionals who designed the training and who urged crisis interven-
tion believed that most cases involving intimate violence were
in fact devoid of violence. Such incidents were viewed as “family
squabbles,” where the male partner was emasculated by the
female partner. Officers were to take on the role of “counselors
and mediators, trained in the skills of crisis intervention.” Arrest
was perceived as totally inappropriate.22
Two cases in the 1970s illustrate what I term “police arrest
avoidance”—a strategy employed by police personnel regardless of
jurisdiction. In 1976, the class action suit Scott v. Hart, was filed
against the police in Oakland, California, on behalf of women battered
by their male intimate partners.23 Two months after the California
case, in Bruno v. Codd, advocates filed suit in New York against the
New York City Police Department (NYPD).24 Both cases alleged that
police refused to respond when called in cases where women were
physically attacked.25 In Bruno, the litigants claimed that the police,
courts, and probation departments chose not to comply with the laws
of New York.26 The trial court allowed the suit to continue against
the police, opining that the police department’s blanket prohibition
against arrest, and in favor of crisis intervention, presented a color-
able equal protection claim.27 Two years later, the NYPD, via a settle-
ment, agreed to change procedures and arrest offenders where there
was probable cause to believe that a felony, misdemeanor, or viola-
tion of a stay-away order issued by family court had been violated.28
Hart and Bruno informed advocates’ strategies in terms of work-
ing with the state and with the criminal justice system in particular.
Nationally, Hart and Bruno resonated with advocates. In Colorado,
the Colorado Coalition Against Domestic Violence worked with the
police to change policies concerning arrest in domestic violence cases.29
22. G. Kristian Miccio, If Not Now, When? Individual and Collective Responsibility
for Male Intimate Violence, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 405, 412 (2009).
23. Scott v. Hart, No. C-76-2395 (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 28, 1976); see SCHECHTER, supra
note 6, at 159-60 (discussing Scott v. Hart).
24. Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev’d, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (App.
Div. 1978), aff’d 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
25. Bruno, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 974; Scott, No. C-76-2395.
26. Bruno, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
27. Id. at 977. The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the claims against the
family court and the probation department. Bruno v. Codd, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165, 167 (App.
Div. 1978).
28. SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 160.
29. Interview with advocate in Colorado (2005).
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Not unlike the advocates in New York and California, Colorado activ-
ists changed police procedures by working with the police, judges,
and probation departments.30 Lawsuits were a potential threat, but
as one advocate stated, court challenges would be used only as a last
resort—the “fist inside the velvet glove.” 31 Hart and Bruno provided
the necessary incentive in shaping procedures where arrest was now
internally mandated—not imposed by statute.
By 1994, the landscape changed dramatically. In June of 1994 a
plethora of legislation came out of state houses. It is not a coincidence
that June 17, 1994 was the date O.J. Simpson was charged with the
murder of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman.32 The lethality of male
intimate violence was part of our collective consciousness, and politi-
cians, being political in nature, finally passed mandatory arrest legis-
lation.33 In New Jersey and New York, the state legislatures passed
mandatory arrest statutes.34 By 1994, thirty-two jurisdictions man-
dated that the police must make an arrest in cases of family violence.35
30. Id.
31. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964).
32. Raymond Hernandez, The Simpson Case: The Pursuit; A Spectacle Gripping and
Bizarre, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/18/us/the-simpson
-case-the-pursuit-a-spectacle-gripping-and-bizarre.html.
33. To illustrate that passage of mandatory arrest statutes was a consequence of
political expediency rather than an understanding that male intimate violence was part
of a dominate/subordinate paradigm, the New York Legislature passed the Family
Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act, which included mandatory arrest.
Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, 1994 N.Y. Sess. Laws
ch. 222 (McKinney). Mandatory arrest bills had languished in legislative committees for
ten years, never once getting to the floor of either the Senate or the Assembly. In June
of 1994, the legislature brought it to the floor in both houses and voted to pass it. Id.
Advocates across the state attributed this sudden conversion to the political fallout that
would have occurred if New York had not passed the bill and had been upstaged by New
Jersey and her sister states. How do I know this? I was one of the authors of the manda-
tory arrest piece of the Family Violence Prevention Act and a consistent voice in the New
York State Legislature seeking its passage.
34. I was the co-author of New York State’s mandatory arrest provisions for both the
Criminal Procedure Law and Family Court Act, Article 8. Because of my work as the
founding director of the Center For Battered Women’s Legal Services, I have first-hand
knowledge of the legislative advances in both jurisdictions. There is something to be said
for longevity, if not age.
35. By 1992, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah and
Wisconsin passed legislation mandating arrest for domestic violence. See R. EMERSON
DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 156, 206-07
(1992) (discussing potential legislative and judicial action to combat domestic violence).
The majority of states passed mandatory arrest laws in 1994; most provisions were
drafted with mandatory arrest language and a concept of the batterer regardless of sex,
but arrest records would show that most batterers arrested were male and most victims
were female. Alaska, California, Colorado, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin currently mandate arrest
when there is probable cause to believe that a violation of a protection order has occurred.
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II. CASTLE ROCK, BURELLA AND THE LIES THEY CONSTRUCT
In June 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Castle Rock.36 Two years later, in September 2007, the Third
Circuit released its decision in Burella, reinforcing both the ruling
and the dicta in Castle Rock, and dashing, once and for all, any hope
that Castle Rock’s reach would be limited or that it was the result of
a truly bad nightmare.37 For all practical purposes, mandatory arrest
has been rendered impotent and all avenues of Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process redress have been foreclosed to battered women
and their children. Since a majority of states have crabbed notions
of state accountability in tort—it appears that battered women have
no avenue to enforce state mandates.38 Indeed, what we have is the
illusion of protection, which is worse than no protection at all.
Both Castle Rock and Burella, in lengthy recitations of the facts,
acknowledge the tragedy inherent in the murder of three little girls
and the shooting of a wife by her police officer husband.39 Both opin-
ions demonstrate the moral paucity of our conceptions of collective
accountability now grafted onto the constitutional interpretation of
due process. Thus, their attempts at compassion are not only mis-
placed, but a cruel deception.
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.530(a)(2) (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (West 2001);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.760(2)
(West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79(E) (2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509(b)
(West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.01(14)(e) (West 1990); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(2) (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33.070(1) (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a3) (West 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-13-6(D) (West 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-0.7.1-11(1) (West 1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.310(3) (West 1999);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(1), (2) (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-611(a)(2) (West
1996); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(b) (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-
2.4 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(a) (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 813.12(7)(b) (West 1994). Alaska, Arizona, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, and Washington currently man-
date arrest when there is a finding of domestic violence regardless of whether a protection
order has been violated. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.530(a)(1) (West 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN § 13-3601(B) (2001); D.C. CODE § 16-1031(a) (2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2)(b)
(West 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2140(1) (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 4012(5) (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7) (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-21(a)(1) (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B)(1) (West 1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-2.1(3) (1998); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(c) (West 2001).
See Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic
Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1855 n.42 (2002) (listing states with mandatory
arrest statutes).
36. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 748 (2005).
37. Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 2007).
38. See, e.g., Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-10-
101 to -120 (West 2007) (providing immunity to public entities and employees).
39. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 751-55; Burella, 501 F.3d at 134-38.
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A. Castle Rock and Burella: The Facts
1. The Castle Rock Case
Just as in thirty-one other jurisdictions, the police in Colorado
were mandated to arrest or secure a warrant where “[t]he restrained
person has violated or attempted to violate any provision of a protec-
tive order.” 40 Jessica Gonzales received an order that covered her
and her children with the additional proviso that the respondent
father, Simon Gonzales, would be subject to arrest if he violated any
of the provisions contained in the order.41 In June of 1999, Simon
Gonzales took the three children from their home without notice to,
much less consent from, their mother.42 Simon Gonzales’s conduct
was a cognizable violation under Colorado’s must-arrest statutes.43
Jessica immediately notified police when she realized that her
three little girls were missing and correctly intuited that Simon had
taken them.44 When notified by Jessica, the police chose to do nothing.
Over an eight-hour period the police chose not to enforce the order.45
In the early morning hours following the children’s abduction, Simon
appeared at the police station and opened fire with his shotgun.46
Then and only then did the Castle Rock police begin to investigate.47
They then recovered the bodies of the three little girls in the cab of
the pick-up truck driven by Simon Gonzales, shot to death before his
arrival at the police station.48
Jessica Gonzales sued the State of Colorado under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming that the State violated the Due Process Clause be-
cause the City of Castle Rock and its police department had arbi-
trarily deprived her of the right to the enforcement of the order
without due process of law.49 The district court dismissed the claim
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, in part,
the district court’s decision, finding that the Colorado Legislature, in
passing its mandatory arrest provisions, created a property interest
in the enforcement of orders of protection.50 On June 27, 2005, the
40. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b)(I) (West 2004).
41. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 751-52.
42. Id. at 753.
43. Fink, supra note 2, at 375 (citing Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 748-54).
44. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753.
45. Id. at 753-54.
46. Id. at 754.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004).
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U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court in its now
infamous decision.51
2. The Pennsylvania Case
In January of 2000, Jill Burella was shot by her police officer
husband, George Burella, who then turned the gun on himself.52 Their
marriage was marked by repeated assaults and Jill’s repeated re-
quests to the Philadelphia Police Department (PDD) to enforce the
numerous orders of protection issued by the courts.53 The police
allowed George into the marital home after he threatened his wife,
refused to arrest him for the harassing and threatening phone calls
that they witnessed, permitted his continued possession of his service
revolver after the close of his shift, and recognized his presence on the
force even after he refused to submit to psychiatric counseling as
ordered by the department’s psychiatrist.54 The threats, entry into
the marital home, and continued possession of his service revolver
were all explicit violations of the protective order.55
On January 8, 2000, Jill was shot by her husband.56 Subse-
quently, she filed suit against the City of Philadelphia under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.57 On September 13, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, relying on the ruling in Castle Rock, reversed
the district court ruling that denied the police qualified immunity.58
B. The First Lie: DeShaney Redux
To understand Castle Rock or Burella, one must understand
DeShaney v. Winnebago County.59 In 1985, the Rehnquist Court
severed one connection to state accountability in the now infamous
DeShaney case. In spite of evidence that the State of Wisconsin had
knowingly returned five-year-old Joshua DeShaney to his abusive
father, the Rehnquist Court found that the State’s actions did not
violate the little boy’s substantive due process rights.60
51. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 769.
52. Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2007).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 137-38.
55. Id. at 136-38.
56. Id. at 138.
57. Id. at 135, 139.
58. Burella, 501 F.3d at 135-36, 146, 149-50.
59. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
60. Id. at 202. Joshua DeShaney was beaten by his father numerous times. Id. at 192-
93. After one particularly vicious attack, Joshua was hospitalized. Id. at 192. Because
of the severity of the attack, the State of Wisconsin refused to release the little boy back
into the father’s home absent an agreement where Child Protective Services would monitor
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What drove the majority in DeShaney was Justice Rehnquist’s
belief that the Constitution is primarily a negative rights document
that rules out positive rights claims because “nothing in the lan-
guage of the Due Process Clause . . . requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to
act . . . .” 61 Consequently, there is no affirmative duty to protect
unless the danger or harm is created by the State—and “created . . .
by the State” is narrowly construed to mean only those acts that
directly cause the harm or occur while the individual is in the
State’s custody.62
Here, the Court characterized the cause of the violence as
private because the direct actions of Joshua’s father put Joshua into
a vegetative state.63 The majority disaggregated the State’s act of
returning Joshua to an abusive father from the harm and re-charac-
terized state conduct as inaction.64 The juridical wisdom of the
majority treated the State as mere observer to Joshua’s beating.65
As an observer, the Court found no connection between the State
and Joshua’s injuries; no connection to the victim’s injuries meant
there was no tie or connection to the victim.66 Absent a link to the
plaintiff, the State could not have violated Joshua’s rights.
DeShaney effectively slammed shut the door to claims of sub-
stantive due process violations by the State, except where the victim/
survivor was in the State’s physical custody or when the State itself
created the danger.67 This crabbed notion of state action is the death
the child’s condition in the home environment. See id. (detailing the agreement). As part
of a contract between the county and the father, the State would visit the home to check
on the little boy. See id. (stating visits by Child Protective Services were part of the agree-
ment). On a number of occasions, Joshua’s father refused entry to the case-worker. See id.
at 193 (stating occasions where entry was refused). The State chose not to petition against
the father in family court, and it continued to allow the child to stay in the father’s home.
Id. at 192-93. Moreover, Child Protective Services did not enforce the agreement. See id.
(detailing that Child Protective Services ignored violations of the agreement and did not
act upon evidence of further abuse). Subsequently, the child was beaten into a vegetative
state. Id. at 193. Joshua’s biological mother filed suit against the State of Wisconsin
alleging that its actions violated the child’s due process rights. Id. at 192-93.
61. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
62. Id. at 197, 199-203.
63. Id. at 201-03.
64. See id. at 200-01 (discussing that the Due Process Clause is triggered when the
state’s action, not the action of a private individual, causes harm to a person).
65. See id. at 200-03 (stating that, even if the State knew of the danger to Joshua, it did
not have to prevent the harm because it was not a part of the danger).
66. See id. (stating that the State had no part in the creation or infliction of Joshua’s
harm).
67. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing that the state-created danger theory is
narrowly constructed due primarily to narrow notions of affirmative conduct).
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knell for Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, not
only when battered women assert state refusal to enforce protective
orders, but in cases where any person interposes such an argument.
C. The Second Lie: Castle Rock and Burella
DeShaney, Castle Rock, and Burella are an unmitigated night-
mare. Quite simply, these cases are enraging not because the Court
continues traditions that are morally despicable, but because it does
so wrapped in the Constitution or, more aptly, what it opines to be
the correct version or interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Brennan may have identified the heart of this trilogy when
he claimed in DeShaney, that “oppression can result when a State
undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it.” 68 Brennan did not mince
words here, so neither shall I. The legacy left by these three decisions
casts the Fourteenth Amendment as a mere aspiration.
In Castle Rock, the Supreme Court held that Colorado failed to
create a Fourteenth Amendment property interest in the enforcement
of a protective order.69 In what I term the “yeah, but” theory of con-
stitutional analysis, the Court dismissed not only Jessica’s claim, but
also implicitly the claim of anyone in any of the thirty-two jurisdic-
tions where mandatory arrest provisions exist.
The Court starts from the position that the Colorado statute
permits police discretion, and so is not mandatory.70 But even if the
statute is mandatory, because it allows for two options, arrest or seek
an arrest warrant, and the latter is procedural rather than “an end in
itself,” the legislation is not mandatory.71 “[E]ven if the statute man-
date[s] a nondiscretionary duty on the part of the police,” the duty
does not create a private right or entitlement but rather a public
duty or “public end” à la criminal law.72 Additionally, even if it does
create an entitlement, it is not a due process type entitlement, be-
cause enforcement does not have a “monetary value” 73 and enforce-
ment is “an incidental benefit of a general duty.” 74
Let’s first take the Court’s claim that Colorado never actually in-
tended to do away with police discretion when it passed its mandatory
68. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
70. Roederer, supra note 2, at 329.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id. (arguing that the Supreme Court decision rendered the Fourteenth
Amendment toothless and that based on the legislative intent of the Colorado mandatory
arrest statute and its plain language the Court should have found a property interest).
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arrest statute. The Court starts from the position that the police
have always had discretion when dealing with crime, crime victims,
and perpetrators.75 Scalia asserts, “[w]e do not believe that these
provisions of Colorado law truly [make] . . . enforcement of restrain-
ing orders mandatory,” because “[a] well established tradition of
police discretion has long co-existed with the apparently mandatory
arrest statutes.” 76
As Roger Pilon points out in a provocative examination of Castle
Rock, tradition has trumped not only the text of the statute but
the legislative history of two-thirds of the states. And while Pilon
raises an important issue about tradition, he mischaracterizes
tradition as police discretion. What drives Scalia’s decision to
trump thirty-two jurisdictions’ legislative history is . . . adher-
ence to the tradition of treating the Fourteenth Amendment as
a negative rights provision.77
Thus, no duty owed, no way, no how.
Think for a minute of what the majority uses to trump Colorado’s
enactment of mandatory arrest. First, the Court uses a 1980 report
from the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.78 The year 1980 is crit-
ical here because mandatory arrest was not on the horizon, much less
a policy, in a majority of states. The issue of male intimate violence
was just coming to the attention of the American people and the crim-
inal justice system. Indeed, some of the first national discussions
had only occurred in the late 1970s, and the findings of the Attorney
General’s Task Force were not part of water cooler discussion much
less legislative strategy.79 Moreover the idea of mandatory arrest was
in its infant stage. Therefore, it would have been impossible for the
ABA to have contemplated, much less factored in, the reasons for
arrest mandates in its report.
As for the second reason, Scalia claims that the arrest or seek a
warrant provision cannot possibly mandate behavior because “seek-
ing . . . an arrest warrant would be an entitlement to [do] nothing but
procedure.” 80 “And where there is a procedure there is discretion, thus
the statute does not form the ‘basis for a property interest.’ ” 81
75. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-62 (2005).
76. Id. at 760.
77. Miccio, supra note 22, at 420 (citing Roger Pilon, Town of Castle Rock, Executive
Indifference, Judicial Complicity, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. L. REV. 101, 116 (2005)).
78. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760-61 (citation omitted).
79. ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT iv, vi, vii, 2 (1984).
80. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 764-65.
81. Miccio, supra note 22, at 422.
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The police, not unlike judges, must decide whether there is prob-
able cause. But once probable cause is established, either by law
enforcement or the bench, there is only one course of action—arrest
or issuance of a warrant. Characterizing the function of the police or
judges under mandatory arrest statutes as discretionary misstates
or misapprehends “discretion.” The probable cause determination by
a police officer or a court is not a discretionary act. It requires assess-
ment of the evidence. It is ministerial. Moreover, an officer or a judge
is not empowered to disregard the mandate once probable cause is
found to exist. Mandates replace a universe of potential action with
one option: arrest/warrant. I do not believe for one moment that Scalia
was so imperceptive as to not understand the nature of “shall” in the
context of law enforcement. “Scalia’s argument here is simply too
precious to be credible.” 82
Scalia’s third and fourth points are equally specious. Scalia
claims that Jessica Gonzales’s protection vis-à-vis enforcement of
the order was incidental.83 Yet, to claim that Jessica was an indirect
beneficiary of the must arrest statute is revisionism at its worst.
While Simon Gonzales would have been the subject of police attention,
Jessica was the object of the protective order. As a battered woman
she was within the ambit of protected person as contemplated by the
legislature and the Battered Women’s Movement.84 Jessica Gonzales
was a member of a specific class of individuals singled out by the
statute for protection.85
The Court’s final justification is as Byzantine as the prior three.
Scalia believes that since a monetary value cannot be ascribed to
enforcement, Gonzales fails to raise a cognizable property interest
protected by due process.86 But Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth87 tells us something entirely different, a message that Scalia
refuses to recognize much less acknowledge. Property interests are
varied and encompass more than “real estate, chattels, or money,”
because they include intangibles “relat[ing] to the whole domain of
82. Roger Pilon, Town of Castle Rock, Executive Indifference, Judicial Complicity, 2005
CATO SUP. L. REV. 101, 118 (2005).
83. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 749, 766-67.
84. The raison d’etre of mandatory arrest is to abate the violence. See Roederer, supra
note 2, at 323-24 (detailing the Colorado statute and its intended beneficiaries).
85. See Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137, 143 (Or. 1983):
[S]tatutory arrest provisions . . . identify with precision when, to whom and
under what circumstances police protection must be afforded. The legislative
purpose in requiring the police to enforce individual restraining orders clearly
is to protect the named persons for whose protection the order is issued, not
to protect the community at large by general law enforcement activity.
86. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768.
87. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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social and economic fact.” 88 And while this may be an inartful way
to describe property, it does get to the heart of the matter. Scalia
dismisses conceptions of property worthy of due process protection
by adopting a narrow definition, one that has been rejected by both
the dissent in Castle Rock and the majority in a raft of Supreme
Court decisions.89
As I reread Castle Rock, the questions that emerge are troubling.
Why did Scalia not use the 1993 Federal Violence Against Women
Act Report that found that police arrest avoidance contributed to the
continued perpetration of male intimate violence?90 Why did Scalia
not refer to the plethora of amicus briefs that discussed in exacting
detail the reasons why discretion was removed from the police?91
88. Id. at 571-72, 577 (quoting Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646,
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush, 455 U.S. 422, 430
(1982) (stating that one characteristic of property rights is that they vary).
89. Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 773-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972). The Court has found property interests created by state-conferred
social benefits. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (disability benefits); Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) (public education); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970) (welfare benefits).
90. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
OF 1993, S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (1993) [hereinafter VAWA SENATE REPORT].
91. See Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Women Lawyers and the Nat’l Crime Victims Bar
Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8-10, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328201 (discussing the consequences of
domestic violence and failure of police to enforce mandatory arrest statutes); Brief for
the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 17-22, Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328202 (explaining how the police fur-
ther endanger victims of domestic violence when they fail to enforce protection orders);
Brief for the Nat’l Black Police Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27-
30, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328203
(discussing police protocol with respect to domestic violence); Brief for the Nat’l Network
to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 20, 28-30, Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353608 (discussing
pervasiveness of domestic violence and the likely increase in such violence to result from
failure to enforce protection orders); Brief for the AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 4-10, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278),
2005 WL 353692 (discussing domestic violence in the specific context of elder abuse); Brief
for the Family Violence Prevention Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at
4-10, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353693
(discussing domestic violence and its consequences for children); Brief for Peggy Kerns,
Former Member of the House of Representatives of Colo., and Tex. Domestic Violence
Direct Serv. Providers, as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12-14, 18-21, Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353694 (discussing the
societal impact of domestic violence and the danger of allowing police too much discretion
in enforcing protection orders); Brief for Nat’l Coal. Against Domestic Violence and Nat’l
Ctr. for Victims of Crime as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 12-17, Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353985 (explaining police
procedure and the increased danger to domestic violence victims that results from failure
to enforce protection orders); Brief for Int’l Law Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 27-28, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278),
2005 WL 328200 (discussing the impact of police failure to enforce protection orders on
U.S. treaty obligations).
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And finally, why did Scalia effectively overrule the legislative his-
tory that supported the plain language of the Colorado statute? He
did so, not merely to reinforce police discretion and crabbed notions
of “property,” but to reinforce the traditional negative view of consti-
tutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. This is the
third and final deception.
III. THE THIRD AND DEADLIEST LIE—THE “WHY”
Don Coreleone said it better than anyone, “keep your friends
close, but your enemies closer,” 92 and while I do not consider the
Supreme Court an enemy, I do find their ruling and rationale in Castle
Rock inimical to the welfare, rights, and lives of battered women
and their children. And if we take Castle Rock together with Burella,
the stakes are raised even higher because the promise of the Due
Process Clause is forever outside the reach of battered women.93
After Castle Rock, advocates believed that if we did what Scalia
told us to do, specifically go back to the legislative drawing board and
make our laws “more mandatory,” 94 the promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause would be attainable in our lifetime.
Remember, Scalia told us that “shall,” meant “maybe or maybe not,”
dismissing out of hand the legislative history of thirty-two states and
the plain statutory meaning of the word.95 I guess to the good Justice,
the Ten Commandments are merely the ten suggestions. From a
policy standpoint, I cannot envision how one makes “a peace officer
shall arrest, or . . . seek a warrant,” more mandatory.96 Perhaps, if the
Colorado Legislature had appended the words, “and we really, really
mean it, no kidding,” it would have satisfied the majority. But I think
not. Nothing would have satisfied this Court. The question is why.
A. The Legal “Why”
Since DeShaney in 1985, scholars have commented on the neg-
ative rights aspect of the U.S. Constitution. Barbara Woodhouse
profoundly understood that the turn of events in the Twentieth
92. THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 623 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (quoting THE
GODFATHER: PART II (Paramount Pictures 1974)).
93. Clearly, if the composition of the Court changes and Justices who have a his-
torically correct and more compassionate view of the Due Process Clause are appointed,
then the effect of Castle Rock may be reversed. Indeed, one can hope that the Court will
follow the example of Lawrence v. Texas by reversing itself. I do not, however, think that
this outcome is probable in the near future. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
94. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005).
95. Id. at 760-61.
96. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (West 2004).
294 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 17:277
Century, which reduced the Due Process Clause to a reactive rather
than proactive proviso, would have devastating effects on women and
on issues particular to violence against women.97 Essentially, the
modern reading of Fourteenth Amendment due process is basically
a “keep your laws off my body” approach. This affected the decision
in Harris v. McRae,98 in which the Court held, inter alia, that because
the state did not create poverty, it has no duty to provide poor women
with abortions.99 Thus, the State can restrict access to abortions by
restricting the flow of funds to poor women for this medical proce-
dure.100 And because the “negative” aspect of the theory of negative
rights adopts a restrictive view of state action, legal guarantees move
beyond women’s reach.101
Let us go back to DeShaney for a moment to decode the negative
rights position of the Court. First, one has to start from the premise
that the Constitution is a negative rights document. Second, if it is
a negative rights document, there is no duty for the state to act or
be proactive. Third, if there is no constitutional duty to act, then
duty arises only where state conduct is characterized as affirmative.
This is illustrated in the Rehnquist Court’s treatment of the harm to
Joshua DeShaney. Here the Court privatized the harm because it was
Joshua’s father who beat him so severely that Joshua suffered brain
damage.102 And the Court concluded that the State of Wisconsin did
nothing to cause Joshua’s injuries; it merely failed to act or to pro-
tect.103 The state’s return of the child to his father was not affirmative
conduct, so state conduct was recast as inaction.104 Because the action/
inaction paradigm is a natural corollary of negative rights theory,
97. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Abuse, the Constitution, and the Legacy
of Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 483 (2001) (noting that the
substantive due process decisions share the failings of treating “commerce and labor, the
family and market as even playing fields”).
98. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
99. Id. at 316-17.
100. Id. at 316; see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum:
Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 330, 330-32, 336 (1985) (discussing how the abortion funding cases raise questions
about negative versus positive rights).
101. Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon wrote:
If one group is socially granted the positive freedom to do whatever it wants
to another group, to determine that the second group will be and do this
rather than that, no amount of negative freedom legally guaranteed to the
second group will make it the equal of the first. For women this has meant
that civil society, the domain in which women are distinctly subordinated and
deprived of power, has been placed beyond the reach of legal guarantees.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 164-65 (1989).
102. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 187, 193 (1989).
103. Id. at 203.
104. Id.
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where there is no affirmative duty the Court must find affirmative
conduct in order to impose liability.105
The lexicon reaffirms crabbed notions of state action. In DeShaney,
the state’s conduct is described as a failure or omission to act.106 As
any first-year law student knows, where there is a failure/omission to
act, one must find a legal duty to act. Just as first-year law students
learn that the beachcomber, surfer, or sun worshiper has no duty to
rescue the drowning swimmer, the state has no duty to rescue because
the state is treated no differently than Beachcomber Bill.107 Thus,
if we characterize the state’s “act” as inaction (omission) we need to
find a legal duty before we can hold the state liable. And because the
police (the state) owe only a generalized, and not a particularized,
duty of care, the characterization of the act is critical when claiming
a constitutional tort.108
But what if we thought about conduct differently? What if we
recognized that conduct has both positive and negative elements? For
example, if I am driving my car and hit a pedestrian, characterizing
my conduct as continuing to drive would be just as correct as charac-
terizing my conduct as failing to apply the brakes. By applying my
theoretical paradigm to the facts in DeShaney, negative acts, or in-
action, are transformed into positive or affirmative actions. The State
of Wisconsin returned Joshua to his father with the knowledge that
the boy had been beaten so severely by his father that he had been
hospitalized.109 And, the State continued Joshua’s placement even
though his father violated the agreement by refusing Child Protective
Services (CPS) access to his son.110 The “failure to protect,” is not
based on inaction but on the actions taken by the state, which placed
little Joshua in a known zone of danger—no different than if CPS
had placed the child in front of a speeding car. Not unlike the glass
half-empty/half-full conundrum, how we characterize conduct flows
from our perspective.111 While such characterizations are harmless in
105. Id. at 195, 199-200.
106. Id. at 203.
107. See G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty,
and Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 141 (2005) (citations
omitted) (analyzing tort theories as applied to the state, including duty and conceptions
of active/passive conduct, arguing that these standards permit the state to escape re-
sponsibility for the perpetuation of harm to women from male intimate partners and that
these standards have been imported into conceptions of a negative rights Constitution
and state accountability).
108. Id. at 117, 146. I would argue that the idea of a generalized duty of care flows from
the priority to protect the state from lawsuits, and monetary damages, and reinscribing
the reach of the Public Duty Doctrine (qualified immunity). Id. at 118.
109. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
110. Id. at 192-93.
111. Miccio, supra note 107, at 147 (rejecting the action/inaction paradigm).
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the context of the glass parable, they are devastating in the context
of battered women’s lives. So why does the Court take such a narrow
view of state conduct?
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s adherence to a negative rights standard
is rooted in principles of federalism that foster clear and unequivocal
lines of demarcation between state and federal power.112 As Michael
J. Gerhardt notes, Rehnquist wants to maintain separate spheres of
state and federal authority, recognizing only a “coterminous” inter-
section between state and federal power when the state violates
clearly defined negative restraints.113 For Rehnquist, a negative rights
approach safeguards the delicate balance that federalism constructs,
and perhaps more importantly, preserves.
Yet Rehnquist’s narrow interpretation of the Due Process Clause
is antithetical to its origins. The Reconstruction Amendments, and
specifically the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
were enacted to provide protection when states refused to protect the
fundamental rights of their citizens.114 The Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to act as an antidote to states’ turning a blind eye to
violations of citizens’ life, liberty, and property interests by the state
or by private actors.115 It was to be a haven in a heartless world.
What of Castle Rock and Burella? One could argue that my
analysis up to this point seems misplaced because Castle Rock and
Burella, in part, raise procedural and not substantive due process
claims. What does DeShaney or the negative/positive rights debate
have to do with a procedural claim? Everything.
First, the distinction between procedural and substantive is arti-
ficial because “all rights, including procedural rights, are ultimately
substantive”116 because “what we refer to as process is merely the
enforcement given to the natural rights of ‘life, liberty, and estate.’ ”117
I understand that this position is troubling for jurists and scholars
who adhere to a strict reading of the Constitution and have an aver-
sion to collapsing both the distinction between substantive and
112. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effect of Slaughter-House: A Critique of a Negative
Rights View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409, 429 (1990).
113. Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 553 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the approach of the Slaughter-House Court to the question of coterminous
jurisdictions).
114.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 13 (3d ed.
2006).
115. Id.
116. Pilon, supra note 82, at 110.
117. Douglas W. Kmiec, Young Mr. Rehnquist’s Theory of Moral Rights—Mostly
Observed, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1827, 1858 (2006) (examining the moral position taken by
Rehnquist as a young man and how that position influenced his thinking and rulings as
a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court).
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procedural, and the categories under a rubric of “natural” rights. My
critics will claim that this theory gives currency to judicial activism
where rights are invented, such as “privacy” in the reproductive
rights cases. But for scholars such as Roger Pilon and Michael J.
Gerhardt, jurists such as William J. Brennan, and philosophers such
as Immanuel Kant, conceptions of life, liberty, and property flow
from what we call the dignity of the individual.118 Moreover, the very
purpose of the state is to protect our life, liberty, and property, not
because these notions are elevated to the status of rights or constitu-
tionally protected interests, but because they are at the core of what
it means to be human.119 Protection is not conditioned upon the
private/public nature of the violation or the violence. Jessica Gonza-
les had the right to governmental protection because as a member
of the body politic she delegated that enforcement to the govern-
ment.120
I can only imagine the degree of discomfort felt by the reader
when I invoke notions of “natural rights,” but I have spared you a
lengthy discussion of conceptions of “natural rights,” “the state of
nature,” and “the social contract theory.”121 I have also spared you
118. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the United States has a “tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice”);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
105, 105 n.1 (H. J. Paton trans., Routledge 1991) (explaining that the basis of moral law is
to be found in the subject, not the object of practical reason, a subject capable of rational
will, and stating that “[a] rational being himself must be . . . the ground for all maxims of
actions. . .”); Gerhardt, supra note 112, at 427 (“The dual purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, permeating through all of its provisions were (1) to provide constitutional
protection for the fundamental or ‘God-given’ or ‘natural’ rights of all United States citi-
zens by (2) radically altering the design of federalism . . . to invest the federal government
with complete authority to punish the infringement of such rights by either state or private
action.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness,
in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 48 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (stating that Rawls’s conception
of justice centers on equal liberty for all persons).
119. See, e.g., John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of
Civil Government (1690), reprinted in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 53 (Robert
Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (“The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their
[lives, liberties, and estates] . . . .”).
120. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 102-03 (1960) (discussing that, by the delegation of power, law-makers must
be “the servants of the people”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (discussing
liberty and equality in relation to justice); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
15 (1947) (stating the social contract theory, under which the people cede their will to the
common will).
121. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR, THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL 103-12 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier
Books 1962) (1651) (natural laws); see also MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 120 (natural rights);
ROUSSEAU, supra note 120 (social contract theory).
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a lengthy discourse on the whittling away of the promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment starting with the Slaughter-House decision
in 1873.122 Why? Jessica Gonzales had more than a philosophical claim
to protection vis-à-vis social contract theory. She had an order of pro-
tection, issued by a state court with the proviso that if Simon violated
the order, for any reason, the state would enforce that order by either
arresting him or by seeking an arrest warrant.123 The guarantee of
enforcement was reinforced by not only the plain language of the
order,124 but by legislative prerogative.125 Jessica asked only for the
Court to honor the Fourteenth Amendment, which took fundamental
rights and transformed them into national rights that deserved pro-
tection from state interference or neglect.126 The majority would not
honor this commitment, further eviscerating the amendment and the
power vested in the people.
B. The Political is Personal: The Political Why
In the late 1960s feminist activists coined the phrase the “per-
sonal is political.”127 While anti-feminists ridiculed this axiom and
the feminists who created it, feminists were merely transforming
liberalist philosophers’ conception of the “I,” the core or raison d’être
of government.
For the traditional liberalists, women were excluded from the
“I,” because autonomy, as a corollary of individualism, was synony-
mous with maleness.128 The autonomous person was “self-sufficient,
122. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (held that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause protects privileges and immunities incident to national citizenship, not
state citizenship); Gerhardt, supra note 112, at 412-13 (noting that Slaughter-House has
made it easier for courts to erode the Fourteenth Amendment).
123. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005) (citing the protection
order).
124. Id.
125. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-109 (West 2010).
126. Clearly Slaughter-House, which eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
and DeShaney, which neutered substantive due process protection, are in play. But both
turn the logic and history of the amendment on its head. See Gerhardt, supra note 112, at
426-27 (discussing the history of and motivation behind the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG., 1ST SESS. 2765 (1866) (statements of Senator Howard on
the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
127. Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR:
WOMEN’S LIBERATION, MAJOR WRITINGS OF THE RADICAL FEMINISTS 76, 76 (Shulamith
Firestone & Anne Koedt ed., 1970).
128. In classical philosophy, the autonomous individual was gendered, and conceptions
of the liberal self were inherently masculinist, because women were confined to descriptive
categories rooted in irrationality and immaturity. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 101,
at 121 (quoting SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 133 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans.,
1974)) (“Representation of the world . . . like the world itself, is the work of men; they
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separate, and distinct—the rational, ubiquitous being—standing
‘above the fray,’ as Lorraine Code comments, ‘to view from nowhere
the truths the world reveals.’ ”129 The truly autonomous individual
was a rational, (male) disembodied self, “freed from the vagaries of the
body and the senses—disconnected from the self and from others.”130
The autonomous person was not confined to the private sphere, or
cut-off from civil society.131
By claiming the personal is political, feminists exploded concep-
tions of the autonomous self, the “I,” by making real women’s agency
within the family. By recognizing that women’s experience was polit-
ical, vis-à-vis conceptions of power, they turned women’s experience
into an authentic political truth.132 Part of this truth was the recog-
nition that men battered and raped their wives and were protected
by the political, cultural, and legal status quo.133 The law provided not
only the excuse, but also the cover for such violence. As Catharine
MacKinnon notes, violence against women is a means of social con-
trol, maintaining the political status quo in both family and society.134
describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.”); Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (arguing that classical
liberal conceptions of autonomy are “essentially and irretrievably masculine”); see also
Miccio, supra note 6, at 246, 310 & n.327 (theorizing about the gendered nature of Kantian
notions of autonomy and human agency).
129. Miccio, supra note 6, at 310 (quoting Lorraine Code, The Perversion of Autonomy
& the Subjection of Women: Discourses of Social Advocacy at Century’s End, in RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 181,
185 (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000)); see also IMMANUEL KANT, An
Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (Hans
Reis ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970) (positing that individual autonomy is an achievement
of enlightenment—one’s achievement of “emergence from his self-incurred immaturity”).
130. Miccio, supra note 6, at 310.
131. Lorraine Code, The Perversion of Autonomy & the Subjection of Women: Discourses
of Social Advocacy at Century’s End, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 181, 185 (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie
Stoljar eds., 2000); KANT, supra note 129, at 54-55; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 657 (1983).
132. Marjory Fields, Wife Beating: Government Intervention Polices and Practices,
Address at the United States Commission on Civil Rights (Jan. 30, 1970), in U.S. COMM’N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 20-21 (1978) (“Perhaps the
most serious problem for the individual who has suffered from assault is the failure of the
police to respond to call[s] for help.”).
133. Id. at 3-14.
134. See MacKinnon, supra note 131, at 657:
The private sphere, which confines and separates us, is therefore a political
sphere, a common ground of our inequality. In feminist translation, the
private is a sphere of battery, marital rape, and women’s exploited labor; of
the central social institutions whereby women are deprived of (as men are
granted) identity, autonomy, control, and self determination . . . . If the most
private also most “affects society as a whole,” the separation between public
and private collapses as anything other than potent ideology.
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While Castle Rock is intensely personal to and for battered women,
I have reformed the feminist axiom because Castle Rock does more
than negate the political reality of women’s lives: it distorts the
balance of power between the people and the courts.
1. A Delicate Balance: The People and the Courts
From our first history class, Americans learn about the unique
balance between the three branches of government. It is a delicate
balance, where executive, legislative, and judicial actors honor their
different roles. We know that government derives its power from
the governed, the people, and the people are represented by the leg-
islature.135 That body is our voice in political discussions, debates,
and ultimately enactments meant to prescribe individual and collec-
tive behavior.
Rehnquist understood the delicate balance. He also understood
that the people are the “ultimate source of authority.”136 What could
Rehnquist have meant by this? Essentially, we, the people, speak
through our duly elected representatives, and when we speak our
voices must be honored by the executive and by the courts.
In DeShaney, Rehnquist’s use of the negative rights paradigm
did not disturb the balance between the people and the courts. Though
it was problematic for a myriad of reasons, the negative rights inter-
pretation did not insert the Court’s voice over, or to the exclusion of,
the people’s. Why? Because Wisconsin had not enacted legislation
to compel the police or Child Protective Services to act in a specific
manner or produce a specific outcome.137 The same is not true with
Castle Rock or Burella.
In Colorado and Pennsylvania, both state legislatures passed
mandatory arrest legislation as a direct response to police arrest
avoidance in male intimate violence cases.138 Their experience with
law enforcement paralleled that of the other thirty states where man-
135. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to secure these
rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the con-
sent of the governed . . . .”); U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, . . .
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America”); see also Locke,
supra note 119, at 29 (“The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative
power but that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the dominion of
any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact according to the trust
put in it.”).
136. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693,
696 (1976).
137. DeShaney  v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 (1988).
138. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN
§ 6113 (West 2001).
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datory arrest became law: the police were refusing to arrest in cases
where the perpetrator was intimately connected to the survivor.139
Indeed, the hearings for the 1993 Federal Violence Against Women
Act record in exhaustive and graphic detail just how pervasive police
arrest avoidance was in the fifty states; Colorado and Pennsylvania
were no exception to this time honored yet loathsome practice.140
By refusing to accept the statutory scheme of the Colorado State
Legislature, the Court invaded the province of the legislature and dis-
rupted the delicate balance between court and citizen. It is important
to note that, in Castle Rock, the Court never claims that the enactment
of positive liberties by the legislature violated the Federal Constitu-
tion; rather, the Court finds that Colorado’s conduct contradicted the
beliefs or values held by the majority.141 Scalia penned a decision that
primatized a set of beliefs that effectively ran roughshod over the will
of the people and upset the balance struck by the Founders.
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent that Coloradans had sought
to level the playing field and to remedy police arrest avoidance by
passing mandatory arrest legislation.142 To Stevens, the majority
substituted its judgment for that of the people.143 But it is more than
mere substitution or paternalism. As Professor Kmiec believes, it is
judicial arrogance of the worst kind because it negates the positive
aspects of political discourse and action: debate, principled compro-
mise, and tolerable outcome.144 The mandatory arrest process in-
tegrated and validated the voices of the people—people who were
diverse ethnically, politically, and economically. Scalia’s opinion,
and that of the remaining six justices from the majority, reduced the
voice of the people to a mere whisper, shifting power from the people
to the Court.145
2. The Political is Personal: Reliving History
After Castle Rock, the word on the street was that the police did
not have to arrest. They could, if they chose, revert back to the old
139. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
140. VAWA SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 41-45; see also G. Kristian Miccio, With
All Due Deliberate Care: Using International Law and the Federal Violence Against Women
Act to Locate the Contours of State Responsibility for Domestic Violence Against Mothers
in the Age of DeShaney, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 641, 670-77 (1998) (discussing the
impact of the Violence Against Women Act).
141. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-62 (2005).
142. Id. at 779-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 773-77.
144. Kmiec, supra note 117, at 1863-64.
145. Id. (“It is hard to read the majority as saying anything more than ‘We, your judicial
elders, disagree or think this effort imprudent.’ ” (citation omitted)).
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days when arrest was the exception rather than the rule. Although
there is only anecdotal evidence to support the word on the street,
it definitely is not a good time to be battered vis-à-vis the system.146
But then, it has never been a good time.
Castle Rock takes us back before mandates, when the police
did anything but arrest. Cases such as Sorichetti, Hart, Bruno, and
Thurman were cruel reminders that legal and cultural misogyny were
very much alive.147 Mutilated children and the bodies of murdered and
disabled women at the hands of boyfriends and husbands were not
only part of legal history, but of our collective consciousness. Manda-
tory arrest requirements burst onto the political scene, lost momen-
tum,148 and then were revived with the Brown/Goldman murders.
There was a sense that politicians finally understood what feminists
had been saying for years—that women deserved equal justice and the
right to live their lives free from terror and home-grown violence.
After the Castle Rock decision was publicized, the Denver Post,
on its web site, held a vote as to whether or not Jessica Gonzales had
the “right” to sue the police.149 It seems that the Fourth Estate be-
lieves that the right to protection should be determined by a show of
hands.150 Castle Rock is more than a Supreme Court decision con-
tained in a reporter that will in time collect dust. It is a seismic shift
146. See Court: Police Can’t Be Sued For Not Enforcing Restraining Order, DENVER
NEWS, June 27, 2005, http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/4655165/detail.html [herein-
after Restraining Order] (discussing the town of Castle Rock’s response to the outcome in
Castle Rock v. Gonzales).
147. See supra Introduction, notes 21-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Hart and Bruno. Sorichetti v. N.Y. Police Dep’t resulted in the largest settlement against
the New York City Police Department when police failed to enforce an order of protection
against the respondent-father who disemboweled his daughter and mutilated her so
severely that she remains in a vegetative state twenty-five years after the attack. 482
N.E.2d 70, 70-74 (N.Y. 1985). Thurman v. City of Torrington was the first section 1983 case
involving a battered woman who was beaten in the presence of a police officer who, while
Ms. Thurman was being stomped on by her husband, remained in his police car and did not
come to her aid. 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1524-26 (D. Conn. 1984).
148. Mandatory arrest stalled in states because there was much discussion and concern
about its effect on communities of color among activists in the BWM. There was a belief
that women of color, i.e., African-American women, would not call the police because of
racism within the law enforcement community and the courts. This perception was prob-
lematic after a study found that African-American women were more likely to call police
than their white counterparts. Ira W. Hutchison & J. David Hirschel, Abused Women:
Help-Seeking Strategies and Response Utilization, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 436,
451-54 (1998) (reporting that low-income and African-American women who were battered
were more likely to rely on police response than were higher-income and white women who
were battered).
149. Restraining Order, supra note 146.
150. THOMAS CARLYLE, The Hero as Man of Letters, Johnson, Rousseau, Burns, in 1
CARLYLES’ WORKS SARTOR RESARTUS: HEROES AND HERO-WORSHIP 377, 386-87 (Boston,
Estes & Lauriat 1884) (“Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the
Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.”).
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which holds the political power to determine how the people shall
live, order themselves, and express compassion. Mandatory arrest
was one way that Colorado and her sister states demonstrated to
battered women and their children that they heard, recognized, and
validated not only their stories, but also their pain. Castle Rock
changed this, and it is political as well as very personal.
C. The Economic Why: To Serve and Protect the Interests of the State
This result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat
the Fourteenth Amendment as a “font of tort law.”151
To this Court, not only is the Fourteenth Amendment a negative
rights provision, but police arrest avoidance cases are matters best
left to state courts.152 Negligence claims in state court are the appropri-
ate vehicle to raise issues of state accountability, not the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. But the confluence of the Public
Duty Doctrine (PDD)153 and, in Colorado’s case, the Governmental
Immunity Act (GIA)154 bars litigants, such as Jessica Gonzales, from
filing negligence claims against the state.
In police negligence cases, the PDD recognizes a duty to the
public, not to individual citizens,155 unless a particularized connec-
tion exists between the police officer and the citizen—and the courts
and the legislatures narrowly construe this connection.156 In Colorado,
151. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (citation omitted).
152. Id. at 768-69.
153. It is important to draw a distinction between the doctrines of sovereign immunity
and public duty. The latter is a tort doctrine created by statute that limits immunity while
at the same time creating a narrow conduit through which suits against the state must
pass. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 88 (2001).
Sovereign immunity is a common-law doctrine rooted in the British common-law system
where the Crown was immunized from suit. According to Justice Holmes, “A sovereign is
exempt from suit . . . on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.” Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
154. See Governmental Immunity Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-110 (West 2010)
(limiting the liability for public entities to actions that were “willful and wanton”).
155. Cynthia Zellner MacKinnon, Note, Negligence of Municipal Employees: Re-Defining
the Scope of Police Liability, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 720, 724-29 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon,
Negligence of Municipal Employees] (discussing cases accepting or rejecting the PDD);
see also Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597, 599-600 (Ariz. 1982) (noting that certain areas of im-
munity for state actors remained protected even after “removing the public/private duty
doctrine”); Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Conn. 1982) (discussing
the distinction between public and private duties); Riss v. City of N.Y., 240 N.E.2d 860, 861
(N.Y. 1968) (“[T]here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the
powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of
tort liability for police protection to [individual] members of the public.”).
156. See MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees, supra note 155, at 721 (dis-
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the GIA adds an additional hurdle severely restricting one’s ability
to sue state actors by requiring willful conduct on the part of the
tortfeasor.157 Thus, for Jessica Gonzales, the PDD and GIA were
impenetrable barriers that could not be overcome. And, the Court
knew this.158
Why was the Court so duplicitous? Because preservation of the
economic status quo was more important than the truth; and the
truth is, a miserly process exists at the state level providing little if
any comfort or recompense for battered women and their children.
1. The Floodgates Argument
The Court bought the town’s floodgates argument. The “flood-
gates” argument is quite simple: if the Court rules in favor of Respon-
dent Gonzales, battered women will come out of the woodwork to sue
the state. If this happens, and liability claims against the state are
allowed and successful, potential judgments would severely cut into
public monies earmarked for services.159 And such a reduction would
result in either cutbacks or the elimination of much needed public
services.160 Indeed, the Denver Post, in one of its less than thoughtful
articles, parroted the floodgate argument.161 This “Chicken Little the
Sky is Falling” defense was premised on nothing more than unadul-
terated conjecture. It was hyperbole at its best.
Amici for the Town of Castle Rock sounded this alarm, repeat-
edly.162 As the Petitioner noted, the “flood[gates]” would open and
states would go bankrupt.163 Rubbish. Why rubbish? Because DeShaney
and restrictive policies under state tort law have shut the door on
negligence claims. Hence, this argument is unfounded. As a result,
there is no way to test whether a more open and flexible policy on
cussing the particularized connection requirement and law enforcement cases that found
that such connections did not exist).
157. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-105(1) (2010); see also Miccio, supra note 107, at 131
(citation omitted) (discussing the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act).
158. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 769 n.15 (2005).
159. MacKinnon, Negligence of Municipal Employees, supra note 155, at 727-29; see
also THOMAS M. COOLEY & D. HAVERY HAGGARD, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR
THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 300, 385-87 (4th ed. 1932)
(discussing an officer’s liability in private suits); EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 18 THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.04.25, 193-209 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the negative effects
of imposing liability on municipalities).
160. Casey v. Geiger, 499 A.2d 606, 614 (Pa. 1985).
161. Restraining Order, supra note 146.
162. Brief for Int’l Mun. Lawyers Ass’n. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
3-4, 8-9, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278).
163. Brief for Petitioner at 37, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2004)
(No. 04-278).
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state accountability would produce the outcome suggested by the
majority, the town, or the town’s friends. Simply put, the floodgates
argument is mere speculation and a contrived “what if” game.
2. The Cost of Male Intimate Violence
We do know the price if male intimate violence is left unabated.
Yet, the Court’s adoption of the floodgates argument ignores the socio-
economic cost of police refusal to protect in male intimate violence
cases, as is reflected in the economics of violence, depletion of human
capital, and lack of accountability. As one advocate correctly noted,
“It’s either pay now or pay later.”164
Just what are the economics of male intimate violence? Accord-
ing to the federal Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),
intra-familial violence is pervasive, and it disproportionately affects
women.165 Indeed, Surgeons General—from Koop to the present—
have warned that male intimate violence is the leading cause of in-
jury to women in the 15-44 age group.166 Studies undertaken after the
1992 public hearings held by the Judiciary Committee confirm that
male intimate violence is at the epicenter of violence against women
and that it is very costly in terms of hospitalization, lost wages, court
costs, and incarceration.167 In his dissenting opinion in Morrison,
Justice Souter noted that Congress estimated the cost of domestic
violence at three billion dollars a year.168 And as Joan Zorza points
164. This comment was made by an advocate in New York City.
165. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(commenting on the financial costs of domestic violence (citation omitted)); see also VAWA
SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 38.
166. VAWA SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 38 (1993) (“Violence is the leading cause
of injuries to women ages 15 to 44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings,
and cancer deaths combined.” (citing Surgeon General Antonio Novella, From the Surgeon
General, U.S. Public Health Services, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3132 (1992))); see also PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iii-iv (2000) [hereinafter USDOJ NVAW
SURVEY], http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf (documenting the results of a study
of violence against women); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RESEARCH IN BRIEF, PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE,
AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 2 (1998), http://ncjrs.org/pdffiles/172837.pdf (document-
ing the results of another study of violence against women).
167. See, e.g., USDOJ NVAW SURVEY, supra note 166, at 59-61 (reporting that violence
against women is predominantly intimate partner violence and detailing the social costs
of such violence).
168. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 632 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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out, male intimate violence is the primary factor in women and
children’s homelessness.169
There are hidden costs as well. When male intimate violence
remains unabated in families, it is used to sever the mother-child
bond.170 In New York City, the former Child Protective Services
(CPS)171 routinely petitioned against battered women when evidence
was present that children were in the home at the time that violence
occurred.172 In such cases, the State charged that battered women
“ ‘engaged in domestic violence.’ ”173
Another possible outcome in child abuse/neglect cases is the
placement of children in foster care. A family law attorney with exten-
sive experience in representing children in New York City’s Family
Court remarked that the combined effect of domestic violence with
the AIDS epidemic taxed the foster-care system in New York.174 In-
deed, this attorney speculated, and the studies support her belief that
169. Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 383, 384 (1994).
170. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 843-44 (N.Y. 2004) (discussing an in-
stance where a mother was separated from her child by the state as a result of suffering
domestic violence); see also Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child:
The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 566-
78 (2004) (discussing the increasing frequency of removal of children from their battered
mothers’ homes and arguing that it is wrong to charge battered women with child abuse
or neglect for failing to protect a child from witnessing domestic violence); G. Kristian
Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, and Recreating the
Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 105 (1999)
(“The state’s refusal to intercede as an affirmative protector of the mother-child relation-
ship, while being altogether too willing to separate the child from her, makes the mother
a disengaged stranger to the law.”); G. Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and
Children: Deconstructing the Myth of the Passive Battered Mother and the “Protected
Child” in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1095 (1995) (“Furthermore, be-
cause of the frequency and unpredictability of violence against women by intimate part-
ners, strict liability portends a culture in which removal of children, the break-up of the
family (mothers and children), and state control over mothers and children become the rule
and not the exception.”) (internal citation omitted).
171. It is interesting to note that New York’s CPS has undergone a series of name
changes—from Child Welfare Administration to Child Protective Services to the New York
City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS). It appears that these name changes
coincide with public scrutiny that has focused on the inadequacies within the agency. See,
e.g., Sorry, Rudy, You Had It Right the First Time, NEWSDAY, Sept. 5, 1996, at A38 (dis-
cussing Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s creation of the Administration for Children’s Services
amid criticism of the City’s “Child Welfare Administration”).
172. See, e.g., Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 842-43 (“Plaintiffs alleged that ACS, as a matter
of policy, removed children from mothers who were victims of domestic violence because,
as victims, they ‘engaged in domestic violence’ and that defendants removed and detained
children without probable cause and without due process of law.”).
173. Id. at 842.
174. Interview with Bonnie E. Rabin, Esq., N.Y., N.Y. (Summer 2004).
2011] THE DEATH OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 307
if placements continued at current rates, the foster-care system in
New York City would collapse by the mid-twenty-first century.175
There also are costs in terms of human capital. By human capital,
I refer to human resources, such as time, energy, emotion, and psychic
energy that individual women must expend to survive from day to
day. When children are involved, such costs dramatically increase.
Martha Mahoney observed that battered women are constantly
mediating, planning and strategizing so as to survive from day to
day, week to week and month to month.176 By engaging in resistant
self-direction, women’s inner resources are depleted. And when such
resistance must be part of daily life, the expense to the individual
is incalculable.
Of equal importance is how the gendered nature of such conduct
remains invisible and unobserved. The failure to hold institutions
accountable for such practices creates a communal as well as indi-
vidual harm. VAWA hearings documented the pervasiveness of male
intimate violence.177 Moreover, the hearings identified myriad issues
concerning the gendered nature of state conduct—and how such con-
duct contributed to the perpetuation of violence regardless of whether
such conduct is characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance.178 The
Senate Judiciary Committee found crimes that “disproportionately
affect[ ] women are often treated less seriously than comparable
crimes affecting men.”179 In Washington, D.C., even though police pro-
tocols mandate arrest in domestic violence cases, arrests were made
in less than fifteen percent of cases where the survivor was bleeding
from her wounds.180
In Navaro v. Black, the Sheriff’s Department in Los Angeles
County, California was alleged to routinely classify domestic violence
175. Id.
176. Martha R. Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence, and
Agency, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE 64 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
177. See, e.g., VAWA SENATE REPORT, supra note 90, at 41 (“[I]n over 85 percent of the
family violence cases . . . police did not arrest her abuser. Moreover, family violence
accounts for a significant number of murders in this country. One-third of all women who
are murdered die at the hands of a husband or boyfriend.”) (internal citations omitted).
178. See id. at 1-3 (demonstrating the breadth of issues addressed within the Act and,
impliedly, during the U.S. Senate hearings).
179. Id. at 49.
180. See id. at 41 (citing KAREN BAKER, ET AL., JOINT PROJECT, D.C. COAL. AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & WOMEN’S LAW & PUBLIC POLICY FELLOWSHIP PROJECT AT
GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., REPORT ON D.C. POLICE RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
44 (1989)) (noting that arrests are not made in eighty-five percent of instances where the
survivor is bleeding).
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911 calls as emergency procedure calls.181 Instead all domestic vio-
lence calls were routed to the bottom of the response list.182 Such
dumping of domestic violence 911 calls occurred even when battered
women made allegations of protective order violations.183
Yet, due to crabbed notions of accountability vis-à-vis the Four-
teenth Amendment and state tort law, the courthouse door slammed
shut. And, when mandates are not worthy of enforcement; account-
ability is eclipsed.
***
Well, there you have it. The Court has spoken and the news is
not good. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
a worthless proviso in relation to the protection of battered women
from the vagaries of their batterers and from the state’s refusal to
follow mandates. But not because Colorado failed to create a valid
mandate or because Jessica Gonzales did not have a valid order of
protection. And certainly not because the language of Colorado’s
mandatory arrest statute lacked a commanding tone or lexicon. The
Court’s nullification of Colorado’s mandatory arrest law is due to its
application of the negative rights theory articulated so clearly by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in DeShaney.184 In Castle Rock, Rehnquist
was the invisible hand guiding Scalia’s pen.
IV. IS SISTERHOOD POWERFUL?
Failure is impossible.
—Susan B. Anthony185
Since Castle Rock, I’ve noted an anemic response to the Court’s
neutering of states’ mandatory arrest statutes. It is particularly un-
nerving that no viable political response has emerged from state-wide
advocacy groups in Colorado. Advocates have not lobbied to revise
the Governmental Immunity Act or to locate the contours of state
181. See Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 1995), appeal after remand sub
nom. Farjado v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999) (petitioner filed
constitutional claim against state).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 715 (noting that “there were no clearly delineated guidelines for respond-
ing to domestic violence calls, and that as such, the dispatchers were allowed to exercise
unbridled discretion”) (citation omitted).
184. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1988).
185. LYNN SHERR, FAILURE IS IMPOSSIBLE: SUSAN B. ANTHONY IN HER OWN WORDS 324
(1999).
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accountability in domestic violence provisions that permeate state
penal and family court acts. The question is why?
In Colorado, it appears that “reforming immunity statutes is out
of the question politically.”186 Out of the question politically—what
could that possibly suggest? If we decode this phrase, I suspect it
implies that immunity reform is unachievable. And in seeking such
reform, political and economic consequences could be levied against
domestic violence programs in the state. I understand the concerns
and fears associated with swimming against the political tide. And I
have the utmost respect for my sisters and their desire to be cautious.
But I have learned, through personal experience, that there is always
a price to be paid for stretching our collective consciousness by de-
manding accountability or, as written in the Talmud, by “speaking
truth to power.”187 And the truth is, unless accountability is incorpo-
rated into every policy related to male intimate violence, marginali-
zation of battered women will continue unabated. This is what Castle
Rock teaches. This is the hard lesson we should have learned by now.
But for some, impossibility was just another word for “nothing left
to lose.”188
By all standards, the struggle to enfranchise women was out of
the question politically as well in 1776, when Abigail Adams sent John
off with the exhortation, to “[r]emember the [l]adies,” she understood
that women’s political and civil rights were invisible, not merely im-
practical.189 Susan B. Anthony knew that the Declaration of Women’s
Rights, which grew out of the Seneca Falls Convention in 1848,
would not result in enfranchisement nor would such enfranchisement
come without a cost.190 Yet, for over 140 years, suffragists resisted the
impossible. And the cost? The cost was jail, forced feedings, ridicule,
beatings, and, in some instances, death.191
In Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr., re-
minds us that “freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor;
it must be demanded by the oppressed,” and it will cost the oppressed
186. From a confidential e-mail received by the author in May 2008.
187. RABBI SYDNEY SCHWARTZ, JUDAISM AND JUSTICE: THE JEWISH PASSION TO REPAIR
THE WORLD 81-82 (2006).
188. JANIS JOPLIN, Me and Bobby McGee, on PEARL (Columbia Records 1971).
189. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in THE FEMINIST
PAPERS: FROM ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 10, 10-11 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1973).
190. BILL SEVERN, FREE BUT NOT EQUAL: HOW WOMEN WON THE RIGHT TO VOTE 66,
69, 74 (1967).
191. Id. at 75. During a public address in 1905, when she was “literally deluged with
floral tributes” when she rose to speak, Susan B. Anthony recalled the difficult periods of
the movement, stating “[t]his is rather different from the receptions I used to get fifty years
ago. They threw things at me then—but they were not roses.” IDA HUSTED HARPER, 3 THE
LIFE AND WORK OF SUSAN B. ANTHONY 1365 (The Hollenbeck Press 1908).
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dearly.192 Our historical memory evokes images of civil rights workers
during the Mississippi Freedom Summer, who were murdered while
helping to register black voters.193 Registering black voters was not
just out of the question politically, it was deadly—something that
Mickey Schwerner, James Chaney, and Andrew Goodman came to
understand.194 Yet, their deaths did not stop the freedom trains. Dur-
ing that summer, students not only registered voters, they operated
Freedom Schools;195 pragmatism would not trump action or political
courage. The stakes were too high. And so it was for trade unionists,
women’s liberationists, and gay and lesbian activists.196 And so it
was for battered women’s activists. But something has changed: the
sisterhood’s power has dissipated. I wonder, what would Susan B.
think of us?
A. The Final Lie: It Pays to Play Nice
During the past year, I have spent time with advocates in
Colorado and New York. I have spoken with women who were in-
volved with the BWM and have left, some who are relatively new
and some who have been involved for a long time and continue to
participate. What I have heard from many of the women who entered
the movement in the 1960s and 1970s is that the movement has
been conservatized. What started as a grass-roots political move-
ment morphed into a social services entity. Yet, the observation of the
Colorado and New York activists in 2007-2008 is not new.197 In 1980,
192. Martin Luther King Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT
82 (1963).
193. In 1964, hundreds of college students joined the freedom train and buses to help
register black voters during Freedom Summer. Organized by the Student Non-Violent
Coordinating Council (SNCC), black and white kids packed up and left for Mississippi. Eyes
on the Prize, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/eyesontheprize/story/09_summer
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). They were beaten and shot at and some were murdered.
The faces of the dead, images on a TV screen, are imprinted on my memory.
194. Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman were murdered by members of the Klu Klux
Klan in the summer of 1964. Shadi Rahimi, Ex-Klansman, 80, Gets 60 Years in Prison
for 1964 Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/23/
national/23cnd-killen.html. Their beaten bodies were found in an earthen dam by the FBI.
Id. The men accused of the murder were acquitted by a local jury, however all but one
of the defendants were convicted of violating the three civil rights workers’ civil rights
in federal court and were sentenced to terms ranging from three to ten years. Id.
195. Freedom School Curriculum, EDUC. & DEMOCRACY, http://www.educationand
democracy.org/ED_FSC.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
196. See, e.g., DANIEL JACOBY, LABORING FOR FREEDOM: A NEW LOOK AT THE HISTORY
OF LABOR IN AMERICA 94 (1998) (discussing the Ludlow Massacre in Colorado resulting
from union miner strikes); RACHEL KRANZ & TIM CUSICK, GAY RIGHTS 167-184 (rev. ed.
2005) (outlining the chronology of events in the gay rights movement).
197. See Lois Ahrens, Battered Women’s Refuges: Feminist Cooperative vs. Social Service
Institutions, RADICAL AM. 41, 41 (May-June 1990) (discussing the phases of development
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Lois Ahrens wrote that the shelters had devolved from “feminist, non-
hierarchical, community-based organizations [in]to institutionalized
social service agencies.”198 Ahrens predicted that the core of the BWM,
the shelters, would shift from political to social; ideologically disag-
gregating the cause from its political roots, gender dominance, and
methodologically abandoning the collective process model for a tradi-
tional top-down organizational structure.199
I do not believe that Lois Ahrens understood the significance of
her 1980 piece. It presaged not only the political shift of shelters,
but of a critical core within the movement. Ahrens’s analysis of what
happened to a shelter in the American Southwest charted a seismic
change nationally that reallocated power from resident to staff, re-
situated male intimate violence from gender violence to family vio-
lence, and recharacterized women’s actions as passive—a consequence
of learned helplessness.200 Because battered women’s shelters were
the nucleus or ideological center of the movement, their shift from a
political entity to a social services entity is critical because it altered
the ideological construct of the movement. The changes, cataloged
by Ahrens and her contemporaries, profoundly affected not only the
movement, but also social policy that was generated by movement
activists and state actors. As an advocate from Colorado opined, the
movement was transformed into discrete agencies that looked no dif-
ferent from the social service agencies that served the mentally handi-
capped, abused children, and the elderly.201 Their political edge was
lost,202 as was their political agenda, which named the violence,203
of social service entities as refuges for battered women).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 41-42; see also Miccio, supra note 6, at 248-56 (analyzing the intellectual and
political history of the battered women’s movement through the lens of mandatory arrest
and conceptions of autonomy and will).
200. Ahrens, supra note 197, at 42.
201. Interview conducted in summers of 2005 and 2007.
202. A good example of the dull blade wielded by the advocates is the issue of judicial
training raised by members of the Access to Justice Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association. At a series of meetings, advocates correctly identified the judiciary as a
problem in the Denver courts. Two judges were invited to give their opinions and
insights, and interestingly, they reinforced what advocates had been saying about judicial
ignorance of the law and of best practices when dealing with battered women. It was
decided that advocates should have a hand in setting up training, developing a
curriculum for the judges, and facilitating such trainings for new and existing judges.
The group correctly identified the need to have a hands-on approach in training the
judiciary. A member of the committee was instructed to contact the person charged with
judicial training. As the minutes of this meeting indicate, judicial training was placed
on the back burner, because the state actor charged with such training really was not
interested in the Bar Association’s help and there was already training by the Office of
Court Administration. See Colorado Bar Association, Family Violence Program Legal
Representation for Domestic Violence Survivors Committee Minutes (Jan. 9, 2008),
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the perpetrators, and the need for accountability by the state and
state actors.
This political fact of life has had a profound affect on how battered
women’s advocates interact with state actors. After Castle Rock, a
meeting was held in Denver at the Sturm College of Law, attended
by advocates, state actors, and members of law enforcement.204 At this
meeting, it appeared as if the advocates were backpedaling on the
issue of mandatory arrest, rather than examining how non-compliance
undercuts the “mandatory” part of the arrest statute.205 For example,
much discussion centered on the “fact” that mandatory arrest should
be renamed “probable cause arrest” so as to instruct police officers of
the minimum standard for arrest.206 But, if such practices were in fact
commonplace, then law enforcement needed a lesson in constitutional
predicates for detention, which could not be accomplished by simply
renaming a statutory mandate.
Colorado is not the only state where no viable plan has emerged.
In spring of 2007, I was part of a conference call that brought to-
gether advocates from various states and former advocates-turned-
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Family%20Violence/Legal%20Represenation%20for%
20DV%20Survivors/Minutes/2008 %20Minutes/1.9.08%20Minutes.pdf. I understand the
reticence of non-lawyers, and in some cases lawyers, to challenge the perception and
conduct of members of the judiciary and their counterparts in state government, but the
issue of judicial compliance with the law will reoccur unless it is treated as worthy of legal
and political action.
203. Adrienne Rich understood the power of naming. She recognized that empowerment
of a people is derived, in part, through the act of naming—naming the source of oppression
and the site of pain. READING ADRIENNE RICH: REVIEWS AND REVISIONS, 1951-81 100
(Jane Roberta Cooper ed., 1984). The power of naming gives voice to social phenomena,
while making visible the invisible. And it constructs how we interpret certain experiences.
Descendants of slaves, named by their slave masters—whose surnames were passed from
generation to generation—understood this most basic of human dignities. Perhaps that
is why Malcolm X cast off the slave name “Little” and replaced it with an “X” to remind
us that naming is an act of empowerment and a claim of identity. MALCOLM X, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 216-17 (1965). Naming, as the Talmud tells us, breathes
life into a person, into a people. LIVING TALMUD, THE WISDOM OF THE FATHERS AND ITS
CLASSICAL COMMENTARIES 69 (Judah Goldin trans., 1957) (“If not I for myself, who then?
And being for myself, what am I? And if not now, when?”). “Language is a system through
which meaning is constructed and cultural practices organized and by which, accordingly,
people represent and understand their world, including who they are and how they relate
to others.” Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of
Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33, 34 (1988) (postulating that
language is the means by which “people represent and understand their world”).
204. Meeting at Sturm College of Law discussing Castle Rock (Sept. 2005) (author in
attendance). Present at the meeting were members of the Colorado Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, the Denver Police Department, the Sturm College of Law Civil
Litigation Clinic, and Human Services Agency of the City of Denver.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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academics.207 During this conference call, Castle Rock was gently
raised by the law professors and quickly dispatched by the advocates
from at least four state-wide coalitions.208 The feeling that drove such
a choice not to act was that Castle Rock was too confusing, or too dif-
ficult to understand.209 While I do not doubt for a moment that the
opinion reads like an unsolved mystery, perhaps there was something
we could have done to turn a sow’s ear into silk. But nothing came
of the conference call or the meeting at Strum.
Again the question is why? Some would argue it has to do with
money and funding streams that may flow from the state.210 And
while funding did change the composition of shelters and therefore
the movement, this would be an interesting claim for the Colorado
BWM.211 Colorado is one of two states that does not provide funding
to domestic violence programs for overall operational expenses.212 It
appears that the movement in Colorado has been co-opted even before
it has received money from the political establishment.
But there must be more to this. Perhaps advocates are uneasy
about mandatory arrest. If this is indeed the case, then we need to
have a serious discussion about mandates, especially in the age of
Castle Rock. In Colorado and a handful of other states, doctors are
mandated to notify law enforcement if an injury seems to be the re-
sult of domestic violence.213 From 2004 to 2006, I conducted a study
involving close to 400 doctors in the Denver and Eagle Counties.214
Sixty percent of doctors who responded reported that they do not
207. Conference call with advocates facilitated by the Battered Women’s Justice Project
(2007) (author was a participant in call).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. There is no doubt that funding streams and their requisite demands played an
inordinate part in the conservatization of the BWM. See Miccio, supra note 6, at 256-58
(discussing the history of the BWM); see also Ahrens, supra note 197, at 41-47 (discussing
the effect of funding on the development of shelters into social service entities and the
importance of remaining true to feminist ideals); SCHECHTER, supra note 6, at 93-98
(declaring that money was a “mixed blessing” for shelters and detailing how the funding
“undermined important movement principles” in some shelters).
211. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
212. The Legislature has given money for legal services; however more than twenty-two
percent of the $500,000 in 2008 was awarded to Legal Services of Colorado. Memoranda
on file with author.
213.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-135 (West
2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(F) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-29-9 (West
2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 91.003 (West 2010).
214. G. Kristian Miccio, Study on the Reporting of Domestic Violence (2006) (unpub-
lished study) (on file with author). 800 surveys were sent to doctors in Denver and Eagle
Counties. 365 doctors responded, and of those who responded 60% claimed that where
injuries were likely caused by domestic violence, the doctors did not make the required
reports.
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make reports to law enforcement.215 Perhaps mandates should be on
the table, regardless of whether those mandates compel the police or
doctors, because they are not being followed and, with Castle Rock,
they are unenforceable. But this issue is not part of the legislative
conference, or discursive agenda of the leaders of either the state-
wide or national advocacy community.216
The failure of the BWM to address Castle Rock is emblematic of
a much larger problem. It is not about a difference of political opinion
or strategy; rather, as illustrated by the goings on in Colorado, the
BWM lacks a cogent political platform, a political strategy, and the
requisite political courage to make the changes in policy and law
foisted upon it by Castle Rock. It is as if we have battened down the
hatches and kept our heads down while deciding to play nice. But as
social movements before us learned, nice girls (and boys) are irrele-
vant when the struggle is about the liberation of a people, and here
it is about the liberation of women and children from homes marked
by terror.217 And while I have the utmost respect for my sisters and
brothers in the BWM, I am concerned that our failure to confront
Castle Rock head on is a missed opportunity, a missed opportunity to
raise and address the issue of state accountability in an age of denial.
V. WHAT SHALL WE DO?
What shall we do? The answer rests in reforming state tort law,
not in attempting to raise constitutional torts. The Supreme Court’s
adherence to a negative rights constitution makes any claims analo-
gous to Castle Rock a worthless enterprise unless the Court is recon-
stituted with Justices who view the Constitution as a compendium
of negative and positive liberties. Thus, we need to look to negligence
actions against the state. This will require reworking state tort law
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., COLO. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, avail-
able at http://www.ccadv.org/images/2009_CCADV_Annual_Report.pdf (demonstrating
a general lack of public focus on the arrest mandates for police officers or the medical
reporting mandates for doctors); NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE’S 14TH NAT’L
CONFERENCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CONFERENCE AGENDA (2010), http://www.ncadv
.org/files/2010%20Detailed%20Agenda%2062210.php (demonstrating a general lack of
public focus on the arrest mandates for police officers or the medical reporting mandates
for doctors).
217. See Introduction: Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 278, 280 (1994)
(describing the correlation between the more aggressive activist-minded nature of indi-
viduals and the progress of the gay and lesbian agenda from a social movement to a liber-
ation movement); Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Context
and Vision, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (2003) (describing the transformation of the Black
Freedom Movement marked by insistent “demands for justice” and protests that were
“ ‘more vigorous, sustained, and multifaceted’ ”) (citations omitted).
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by limiting the affect of the PDD and, where applicable, state immu-
nity acts in cases of police refusal to enforce orders of protection.
We know that tort law plays an “epistemic role in our soci-
ety . . . by illuminating relationships in the light of our public stan-
dards of responsibility.” 218 It not only attempts to remedy injustice;
it also exposes normative cultural beliefs concerning legal relation-
ships “between parties by articulating and applying conceptions of
responsibility.” 219
The normative beliefs that define state accountability vis-à-vis
police conduct are disturbing because, when police accountability is
part of the calculus, common sense is abandoned and replaced by an
obtuse notion of responsibility. For example, the construct of the
police officer-as-ordinary-citizen denies the integral position that law
enforcement should play in our communities. Moreover, by situating
the police officer on the same level as the ordinary citizen, we obscure
how law enforcement’s negligent conduct contributes to the perpetu-
ation of male intimate violence.
Such formalized equality belies the fact that the police are em-
powered to enforce the cultural prescriptions and prohibitions that
shape individual and collective behavior. Yet the law regards law en-
forcement officers as no different from ordinary citizens, wishing away
the training, power, and authority consonant with their professional
and community status.
The confluence of the PDD with conceptions of duty creates a
non-accountability paradigm that distorts notions of responsibility,
adversely affecting the lives of battered women and the community.220
The question that remains is: What shall be done?
A. The Reformation: Toward a Principled Notion of State
Accountability
The law’s actual effect in the world matters more than the law’s
existence. It means that if we are not getting socially positive results
from law as it is, we need to focus more on law as it should be.221
218. Timothy D. Lytton, Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness, Participation
and the Frontiers of Tort Law, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 470, 504 (2005).
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 167-183 and accompanying text (detailing the cost of domestic
violence).
221. See ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING & LEGAL THEORY 6 (2006)
(“Concrete and stable legal successes are grounded, consciously or not, on theoretical foun-
dations. If theories don’t work in practice, they are not very good theories.”).
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You need spend only a few minutes with Jessica Gonzales to
know that the current accountability paradigm is not working. And
if you have never spoken with a battered woman, simply read the
narratives of women-survivors contained in the pages of testimony
from the VAWA, the state court reports, or the hearings conducted
by the Attorney General and the Commission on Civil Rights.222 Their
words remind us that accountability is lacking, even where policies
mandate police conduct, such as arrest, in cases where battered
woman have called the police.223 The police are ignoring mandates
with impunity.
And why shouldn’t they? Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that “shall,” as in “shall arrest,” means “maybe or maybe not.” 224
According to the Court, mandatory policies do not compel conduct—
they merely suggest behavior.225 Although this approach seems tor-
tured, it logically follows notions of a negative-rights Constitution,
and on the state level, of public duty and private rights in police pro-
tection cases.226 If a police officer is treated as the ordinary disengaged
stranger, protecting individual citizens cannot be compelled. It is this
“logic” that needs reforming.
B. Making Public Policy Accountable to Battered Women and to
the Community: A Higher Standard of Care
It is essential that, where legislation mandates police behavior,
public policy explicitly includes a presumption of duty between the
police and the object of the mandate. The raison d’etre for such man-
dates is to abate violence directed against battered women. Further-
more, where legislation mandates arrest for violent felonies such as
aggravated assault or battery, or violation of a stay-away or no-contact
order, the subject of the mandate is the perpetrator and the object is
the battered woman. Consequently, a duty to care for battered women
derives from the mandate and the fact that the battered woman is
a member of a specific class of individuals singled out by the statute
for protection.
222. See, e.g., COMM’N ON GENDER BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYS., GENDER AND JUSTICE IN
THE COURTS 1-3 (1991) (reporting the pervasiveness of gender bias in domestic violence
cases in the courts and the testimonies heard by the courts).
223. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FAMILY
PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ACT OF 1994: EVALUATION OF THE
MANDATORY ARREST PROVISIONS 45-48 (2001) [hereinafter MANDATORY ARREST] (noting
that even with the mandatory arrest provision in New York’s Criminal Procedure Law,
some police officers in the eight sites studied were not making arrests for a myriad of
spurious reasons); Miccio, supra note 6, at 298 (discussing the report).
224. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 761 (2005).
225. See id. (noting that there is police discretion).
226. See id. at 760-66 (determining that Gonzales did not have a personal entitlement).
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Moreover, police status creates the duty, regardless of statutory
mandate. Here, all citizens are dependent upon the police to address
crime and to provide protection. The police, not the individual citizens,
are trained to spot crime, conduct investigations, and effectuate an
arrest, even with force. Reliance upon police protection then is a given,
unless we are willing to devolve into a society where vigilantism de-
fines protection. I doubt that we are willing to endorse either vigi-
lantism or self-help. Consequently, accountability constructs should
reflect the reality concerning the police, the citizen, and protection.
We are not out of the woods yet, however. Legislation must
clearly articulate standards concerning foreseeability and harm. And
the appropriate standard should be determined by the nature of the
policy initiative.
Where legislation or administrative directive mandates behavior,
foreseeability of the harm is irrelevant. What controls is the existence
of the harm and whether the plaintiff and the defendant are members
of the class defined by statute. Once harm and class are established,
accountability is required and liability should be assessed. Essentially,
mandatory legislation creates a type of strict liability.
Where legislation creates a quasi-mandatory directive or a policy
where discretion remains undisturbed, a hybrid objective/subjective
standard should define foreseeability; thus, constructive knowledge
would suffice.227 Knowledge of the harm by one officer is imputed to
all officers at a specific precinct.228 Particularized knowledge would
not be required and should be specifically excluded from a statutory
or administrative scheme.
There is ample evidence to support this position. Culturally, male
intimate violence has achieved notoriety, as have the social policies
that sanctioned the violence. Indeed, if nothing else was gained by the
O.J. Simpson trial, the American viewer was schooled in how male
privilege and police unaccountability make for a deadly combination.
It is hard to forget the 911 call by Nicole Brown Simpson through
which rage, anger, and violence were indelibly marked on our collec-
tive memory.229 It is also hard to forget how the police took O.J. on
the proverbial walk around the block—even with mandatory arrest
227. A hybrid standard raises the question: What should a reasonable, prudent police
officer have known under the circumstances? The reasonably prudent police officer is sub-
jectively qualified. A balance is struck between the mythical objective person, which in this
case is a police officer, and circumstances particular to the officer on the scene.
228. Constructive knowledge is not a novel approach. The court in Sorichetti v. City of
New York used constructive knowledge. 482 N.E.2d 70, 76 (N.Y. 1985). This standard was
reaffirmed in subsequent cases, such as Cuffy v. City of New York, when assessing liability
on the part of the police. 505 N.E.2d 937, 940-41 (N.Y. 1987).
229. Transcript excerpts of Nicole Brown Simpson call to 911 (Oct. 25, 1993), available
at http://walraven.org/simpson/911-1993.html.
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policies in force in California.230 Consequently, what responding offi-
cers knew in the O.J. case should have been imputed to every officer
from the Brentwood precinct; thus, what one should know derives
from common knowledge of the collective.
The question of harm is more textured, however, because it raises
critical questions as to harm’s constitutive nature. Where legislation
imposes mandatory arrest for violations of stay-away orders, no-
contact provisions, or violent felony offenses, should the police’s
“failure” to secure either an arrest or warrant constitute per se harm?
Or should public policy require “failure plus,” with “plus” amounting
to subsequent violations, physical injury, or both?
To answer this we need to refer back to findings by the Civil
Rights Commission, the U.S. Attorney General’s report, the state task
force reports on women and the courts, and the Federal VAWA.231 All
recognized that systemic neglect contributes to perpetuation of male
intimate violence.232 All specifically pointed to police arrest avoidance
as a major factor in systemic accountability failures.233 Moreover, an
examination of the legislative findings during the debate on manda-
tory arrest produces the same result—the social harm that mandatory
arrest was thought to abate was two-fold: the violence perpetuated
by the batterer and the violence that police neglect created. If we
follow this logic, then police arrest avoidance constitutes the harm.
Thus, failure to arrest or secure an arrest warrant would meet the
harm requirement; “failure plus” is contrary to legislative intent.
While I recognize the validity of this approach because it is sup-
ported by legislative findings nationwide, I am sympathetic to those
who claim that it could overlook the police’s (failed) efforts to arrest
or secure a warrant. Additionally, such a stringent standard could
produce a draconian response from the police where mutual arrest
of battered women and batterers becomes the rule rather than the
exception; a shield transformed into a sword.234
It is also important to note that feminists who crafted mandatory
arrest laws were more interested in infusing care and accountability
into police behavior than in upping the number of arrests made or
230. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 836 (West 2010).
231. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); supra notes 79, 223,
224 and accompanying text.
232. 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
233. Id.
234. In State v. Lucas, Ohio attempted to hold a battered woman criminally liable as an
accomplice to a contempt of court charge when she permitted her ex-husband to attend
their child’s birthday party. 795 N.E.2d 642, 642-43 (Ohio 2003). The prosecutor claimed
that she helped her husband violate a stay-away provision in the protective order by allow-
ing his attendance at the party. Id. at 643. Fortunately, the Ohio Supreme Court struck
down her conviction. Id. at 648.
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warrants issued.235 Therefore, legislation should create a rebuttable
presumption that the state can refute by evidence of due diligence
on the part of the police. This standard strikes a balance between
accountability interests and financial concerns. What should consti-
tute the harm is police behavior that marginalizes male intimate vio-
lence as opposed to failure to arrest or secure a warrant.
Unlike mandatory arrest provisions, where police discretion is
retained, a rebuttable presumption is appropriate. The standard to
refute the presumption, however, should be reasonable police ef-
forts.236 If the state can show that police conduct was reasonable,
then the state will prevail, even though the police failed to arrest or
secure a warrant.
Finally, where restrictions on police discretion are necessary to
ensure protection, legislation that merely creates the restriction is not
enough. Any statutory or administrative scheme must contemplate
how accountability is to be measured, and where appropriate liability
is to be assessed. Experience has taught us that merely articulating
“shall” does not create accountability because cultural and legal pre-
rogative protects the state at the expense of the individual. If we
learned anything in the years since imposition of mandatory arrest
statutes, it is that public policy must specifically enumerate ac-
countability standards or else “shall” will be construed as merely
rhetorical or unworkable abstraction.
CONCLUSION
You have afforded me a courtesy that my own
country has not afforded me, in allowing me to tell
my story for the first time.237
—Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales)
On March 7, 2007, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights heard Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) recount the horror that
235. I was one of the authors of New York’s mandatory-arrest law. I therefore speak
from first-hand experience. The motivation for New York’s law was accountability, not
filling jails with batterers. See Miccio, supra note 6, at 240.
236. I would agree with scholars who opine that courts should not substitute their
judgment for that of the police in jurisdictions where discretion has been retained. See,
e.g., Nicole M. Quester, Note, Refusing to Remove an Obstacle to the Remedy: The Supreme
Court’s Decision in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales Continues to Deny Domestic Violence
Victims Meaningful Recourse, 40 AKRON L. REV. 391, 421-22 (2007) (noting the Supreme
“Court substituted its own policy judgments for those of the Colorado Legislature”
(citation omitted)).
237. Paul Wochter, The Long Wait for Justice, COLUM. L. SCH. MAG., Spring 2008 at
46, 49 (quoting Jessica Lenahan Gonzales).
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eclipsed all emotion on June 9, 1999.238 For the first time, a legal tri-
bunal was privy to the pain, the lost promise, and the unmitigated de-
spair associated with the murder of three little girls while the Castle
Rock police turned a blind eye and a deaf ear to their mother’s re-
peated requests to enforce an order of protection.
March 7, 2007, marked more than Jessica’s chance to speak, but
gave a voice to her three children. It is a shameful reminder that for
battered women and their children, the Fourteenth Amendment is
a hollow promise, a cruel deception. Yet, March 7 is more than a re-
minder of a constitutional failure or a miscarriage of justice; it tells
us that our laws and courts will not extend to battered women the
protection that they deserve. Today battered women are disengaged
strangers to law and to compassion. But there is more to this lesson.
We have deserted Jessica Lenahan, and by we, I include myself
along with the BWM. It is as if her story was a headline today only to
be forgotten tomorrow. Perhaps this is a consequence of shortsighted-
ness or political naïveté. But it really does not matter what the rea-
sons are; the result is that public policies such as “mandatory” arrest
are futile because accountability is absent. And we, the movement’s
movers and shakers, have collaborated in this cruel deception.
I suspect that some may find my critique harsh. I find our silence
harsher.239 So what shall we do? Act.
My hope is that we will find the political courage to write account-
ability into every piece of public policy that affects the lives of battered
women and children regardless of the political cost. My hope is that
we will live the dream of Susan B. Anthony and the advocates who
understood that change is costly, it is painful, and it is inescapable.
And because change is inescapable, the question is whether we shall
be the architects of that change or defer, out of misplaced caution or
abiding fear, to those whose craven sense of justice and compassion
marginalizes battered women’s lives and rights.
As Hillel said, “if not now, when?” 240
238. Ms. Lenahan is represented by the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School.
Professor Caroline Bettinger-Lopez and her students seem to be the only advocates still
standing beside Ms. Lenahan as she fights her battle to bring accountability into our
discourse on justice.
239. At this juncture, I need to recognize the incredible work of Professor Joan Meier
and her clinic at George Washington Law School. The Domestic Violence Project con-
sistently inserts the voice of battered women in appellate cases that have a profound
effect on the way we parse rights/responsibility. And while I have raised these difficult
questions, my concern rests with the battered women’s movement, or rather the estab-
lished domestic violence community, as opposed to individual advocates, many of whom
are tireless in the struggle for battered women’s rights.
240. PIRKE ABOTH 34 (R. Travers Herford ed. & trans., 3d rev. ed. 1945).
